Combating Electoral Violence in Nigeria

Election is the mechanism through which citizens choose their representatives. Its centrality to democratic governance can therefore not be overemphasized. In contemporary times, the nexus between free, fair and credible elections and good governance is so strong that any attempt to subvert the process often invokes the wrath of the people.

It will be recalled that part of the political upheavals we are witnessing in North Africa, the Middle East and some Gulf States are traceable to the inability of the people to freely choose their leaders.

Electoral violence generally refers to violence that is directly or indirectly connected to protest against an election. Nigeria’s post independence history is replete with accounts of incidents of electoral violence.

The violence that took place during 1964-65 elections in the then Western Region (popularly referred to as the “wild, wild west”) which found expression in “operation wetie” is illustrative of the danger associated with electoral violence especially the one that culminated in the 1st Military intervention in Nigeria.

It will be recalled that subsequent elections in Nigeria’s democratic experience were also been marred by pockets of electoral violence. It is important to mention that the degree of electoral violence seem to have scaled down drastically as Nigeria continues her journey to nationhood. The post electoral violence that characterized the 2011 Presidential Election has clearly resonated the challenges of violence in our polity and the need to devise some new ways of stemming the ugly tide of events or completely eliminating same.

3. Nature or Types of Electoral Violence. Electoral violence can be classified into three broad categories namely: (a) Pre-election violence; (b) Volence during elections and;

(c) Post election violence.

Pre-election violence occurs mainly at the stage of Party Primaries, when contestants from the same political Party jostle to for tickets to become the party flag bearers. Experience has shown that at this stage, thuggery, arson, shooting and maiming are deployed to achieve a particular objective.

The pattern of violence at the election stage is not remarkably different. However, in addition to the methods mentioned above, snatching of ballot boxes and papers, kidnapping or abduction of electoral officers and party agents, forcefully preventing voters from exercising their franchise, forcing electoral officers to alter or deface results or result sheets.

The third category which is post election violence manifests in same manner as pre-election violence and usually perpetrated often times by shooting, looting, arson and wanton destruction of lives and properties usually perpetrated by members of a political party that did not win the election.

Examination of the Extant Legal Framework

The 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended) expressly prohibits formation of quasi-military organizations for political purposes. Section 227 of the Constitution provides as follows:

“No association shall retain, organize, train or equip any person or group of person for the purpose of enabling them to be employed for the use of display of physical force or coercion in promoting any political objective or interest or in any such manner as arouse reasonable apprehension that they are organized and trained or equipped for that purpose”

Section 81 of the Electoral Act 2010 prescribes punishment for contravention of section 227 of the Constitution. It provides that any political party or association that contravenes the provision of section 227 of the Constitution commits an offence and is liable on conviction to: (a) N500,000 for the first offence; (b) N700,000 for any subsequent offence; (c) N50,000 for everyday the offence continues.

The Act further provides that any person who aids or abets a political party in contravening section 227 of the Constitution, commits an offence and is liable on conviction to a fine of N500,000 or imprisonment for a term of 3 years or both.

It is apposite to note that apart from the provisions of the Constitution already discussed, the Electoral Act, 2010 (as amended) is replete with provisions specifically aimed at stemming Electoral violence. Although categorized as “electoral offences”, the intention of the lawmakers is quite clear from the provisions.

The relevant provisions in this connection are as follows: (i) Section 94 – Conduct of political rallies and processions; (ii) Section 95 – Prohibition of certain conducts etc of political campaigns; (iii) Section 96 – Prohibition of use of force or violence at political campaigns; (iv) Section 119 – Disorderly behavior at political meetings; (v) Section 128 – Disorderly conduct at Election Day; (vi) Section 129 – Offences on Election Day and

(vii) Section 131 – Threatening Conducts.

All these provisions of the Electoral Act provide appropriate sanctions for contravention of the law.

Adequacy of the Law and Enforcement

A critical appraisal of the Constitutional provisions and the provisions of the Electoral Act already discussed above leaves no one in doubt as to the adequacy of the legal framework for combating electoral violence. What appears to be the problem is the mechanism for enforcement of the extant law.

It has been contended in many fora that the problem with Nigeria has never been the lack of or inadequacy of the law to tackle our developmental challenges; but, the inability of our institutions to enforce the law on account of institutional weakness and sometimes, absence of political will on the part of government.

The power to prosecute electoral offences is vested in the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC). Section 150(2) of the Electoral Act 2010 (as amended) states that:

“A prosecution under this Act shall be undertaken by legal officers of the Commission or any legal practitioners appointed by it”

In view of the dearth of legal officers in INEC and the fact that a plethora of legal practitioners are already appointed by INEC for purposes of defending the Commission before the various election tribunals, it does appear that the Commission is grossly understaffed to effectively prosecute electoral offences.

The delay in grappling with the problem associated with the prosecution of electoral offences is responsible for the perceived indifference on the part of the appropriate authority in prosecuting electoral violence arising from the 2011 elections.

Despite Government’s commitment to prosecute all those involved in electoral violence. One is therefore of the humble opinion that if steps are not taken to prosecute electoral offences, the mileage gained from the last election may diminish in the foreseeable future.

It is in this connection, it is advocated that the country should have a rethink and revisit the proposal to establish the Electoral Offences Commission. It will be recalled that the Uwais Panel on Electoral Reforms made a recommendation to this effect which was accepted by Government.

The legislative proposal was however not passed into law. I however believe that this commission should be established and charged with the responsibility to arrest, prosecute and punish persons found guilty of perpetrating election violence (electoral offences).

Conclusion

I wish to conclude by re-iterating the position earlier taken in the paper that there appear to be adequacy of laws dealing with electoral offences starting from the Constitution to the Electoral Act 2010 as amended. The point has also been made that effective enforcement of our laws appears to be the problem. I have accordingly advocated the enforcement of our laws in order to address the problem of electoral violence.

One important observation that I have made in the paper is that the INEC as presently staffed is ill-equipped to effectively prosecute electoral offences as required on them by law.

Although, one is tempted to ask that the Federal Ministry of Justice be empowered to takeover such prosecutions, I am minded to urge for a revisit of the legislative proposal to create an Electoral Offences Commission along the lines suggested in the Uwais Panel Report on Electoral Reforms.

I am of the form conviction that a body solely established to deal with the problem of prosecuting electoral offences will be more effective in terms of recruiting the requisite staff and concentrating on the discharge of its mandate.

The foregoing is borne out of the realization of the fact that INEC is so overburdened with issues relating to the conduct of elections that the idea of prosecuting suspects or accused persons appears to be a distraction. The idea of an Election Offences Commission should therefore be revisited forthwith and implemented without further delay, so as to enable us to stem the rising trend of electoral violence in our polity.

 (Reference: Vanguard News)